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W. Michael Reisman,t Siegfried Wiessner t t & Andrew R. Willardtt
With due respect to the Agoras and Peripatetics, a "school of thought"
imports more than a venue. It means a community of scholars who identify as
such, share common ideas about social process, a common sense of mission
about that social process, and a common methodology. At the recently
concluded Fifth Annual Young Scholars Conference of The Yale Journal of
International Law,' it became clear that some of the presenters and others in
attendance were open to the idea that their work might benefit from greater
familiarity with-and even study of-what has come to be known as the New
Haven School.
The New Haven School was developed by Professors Myres S.
McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell .McDougal had been trained in classics
and later at Oxford in legal history. Lasswell, at the time that he met
McDougal, was already recognized as one of the most creative political and
social scientists of the twentieth century. 3 The jurisprudential school that they
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1. The Yale Journal of International Law Fifth Annual Young Scholars Conference (Mar. 10,
2007).
2. The locus classicus of the New Haven School is Lasswell and McDougal's two-volume
treatise, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES
IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992) [hereinafter LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY]. For earlier statements, see HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL
INSECURITY (1935); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); HAROLD D. LASSWELL &
ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY (1950); Myres S.
McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS
137 (1953); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories About
International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 188 (1968); and Myres
S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social
Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 807 (1988) [hereinafter McDougal, Reisman, and Willard, The World
Community: A Planetary Social Process]. Other examples of the approach include W. Michael
Reisman, Theory About Law: The New Haven School of Jurisprudence, in 1989/90
WISSENSCHAFTSKOLLEG JAHRBUCH 228 (F.R.G.); and Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-
Oriented Jurisprudence, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 96 (2001). Interchangeably, the main protagonists
have also used the terms "policy-oriented jurisprudence" or "law, science and policy" to designate the
School.
3. In 1960, the American Council of Learned Societies awarded Lasswell a $10,000 prize,
whose citation read: "Harold Dwight Lasswell, master of all the social sciences and pioneer in each;
rambunctiously devoted to breaking down the man-made barriers between the social studies, an so
acquainting each with the rest; filler-in of the interdisciplinary spaces between political science,
psychology, philosophy, and sociology; prophetic in foreseeing the Garrison State and courageously
intelligent in trying to curb its powers; sojourner in Vienna and selective transmitter of the Freudian
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created at Yale adapts the analytical methods of the social sciences to the
prescriptive purposes of the law. Deploying multiple methods, it seeks to
develop tools to bring about changes in public and civic order that will make
them more closely approximate the goals of human dignity which it
postulates.
The New Haven School defines law as a process of decision that is both
authoritative and controlling; it places past such decisions in the illuminating
light of their conditioning factors, both environmental and predispositional,
and appraises decision trends for their compatibility with clarified goals; it
forecasts, to the extent possible, alternative future decisions and their
consequences; and it provides conceptual tools for those using it to invent and
appraise alternative decisions, constitutive arrangements, and courses of
action using the guiding light of a preferred future world public order of
human dignity. To achieve these goals, the New Haven School adapts focal
lenses from the social sciences, a mode of organizing data about various social
processes though cultural anthropology's modality of phase analysis and an
analytical break-down of the actual components of a decision. To facilitate
actual decisionmaking, it proposes a praxis of five intellectual tasks: goal
formulation, trend description, factor analysis, projection of future decisions,
and the invention of alternatives. A public order of human dignity is defined
as one which approximates the optimum access by all human beings to all
things they cherish: power, wealth, enlightenment, skill, well-being, affection,
respect, and rectitude. This, in a nutshell, characterizes the contribution the
New Haven School has made to the law's academic and policy enterprise.
It should be evident that the intellectual tools of the New Haven School
can assist anyone in any context who is grappling with and trying to solve a
problem. This point is worth emphasizing because man people associate the
School only with international law and politics. The, association is
understandable in light of the School's conception of the earth-space arena as,
in Whitehead's words, "a vast manifold' 5 and of the vast literature that has
applied New Haven School jurisprudence to international problems. In fact,
this jurisprudence is designed and has been used to understand and shape law
in all contexts, from the local to the planetary.
That said, the New Haven School can be especially empowering for
individuals not associated with the state, a class that classical international law
all but disenfranchised. In the past, the international lawyer's client was, for
the most part, the Prince or, put in more prosaic terms, governments, however
they were organized. That is no longer the case. Equipped with an appropriate
jurisprudential frame, each and every person can now participate, whether
directly or through the mediation of groups, in the processes of decision that
vision to his American colleagues; disciplined in wide-ranging inquiry; working against resistance to
create a modern quadrivium of the social sciences that will make them truly liberal arts."
4. Curiously, it was a European scholar in a study of the New Haven School who concluded
that its methods were most effective for domestic legal problems. See BENT ROSENTHAL, ETUDE DE
L'OEUVRE DE MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL EN MATItRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [STUDY OF THE
WORK OF MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW] (1970).
5. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1941). See also ALFRED
NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN COSMOLOGY (David Ray Griffin & Donald
W. Sherburne eds., 1978).
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affect their lives. To that extent, we all have the potential to function as the
Prince or as Austin's "political superior." 6 The constant formation and
reformation of interest groups on a planet in which economical, electronic
simultaneity permits effective coordination without face-to-face contact
means that the possibility of meaningful participation in key functions of
international decision is within the reach of more and more people who are
not affiliated with governments. But only if they know how.
For all these actors, the New Haven School assembles a set of tools for
enhancing the understanding and more effective influencing of these
international processes. It is a truism that law is policy, but this is an approach
that is policy-oriented in a much broader sense. With respect to particular
problems, the School seeks not only to map decision processes, assess the
often contradictory trends and the factors conditioning them, predict the range
of probable outcomes, and enhance the skills necessary for influencing the
decision processes of concern so that preferred outcomes ensue. It also
undertakes to improve the performance of decision processes themselves and
enhance their capacity to achieve outcomes more consonant with human
dignity. This necessarily involves a careful assessment and critique of current
processes, institutions and practices.
Now it is clear that, given the characteristics of the international political
process, a way of mapping the processes that lawyers try to influence, and
which are influencing lawyers, requires a different set of analytical tools. A
''conventional" analysis in terms of government organs and of the technical
doctrines employed by officials, an effective technique for certain problems, is
inappropriate for the study of international decision. Conventional usage must
here yield to "functional" analysis, because no dependable relationship exists
between formal structures and the facts of authority and control on the global
scale. It is far from unusual to discover, for example, that the authority
formally provided in a written constitution may be ignored or totally redefined
by unwritten practice; there, too, myth system must be distinguished from
operational code, 7 the law-in-the-books from the law-in-action. When the
international arena is examined, the presumed congruence of formal and
actual authority may or may not be sustained by the concurrence of
expectations necessary to justify a claim of actual constitutive authority.
The comprehensive, analytic framework required must, accordingly,
include a conceptual technique for mapping the relevant processes. The New
Haven School has adapted, with a number of adjustments, a scheme of
cultural anthropology, in which any social process is described systematically
in terms of those who engage in it (the participants); the subjective dimensions
that animate them (their perspectives); the situations in which they interact;
the resources upon which they draw (bases of power); the ways they
manipulate those resources (strategies); and the aggregate outcomes of the
process of interaction, which are conceived in terms of a comprehensive set of
values.
6. Michael Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the "Political Superior," 23
N. KY. L. REv. 605 (1996).
7. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS (1979).
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The participants in any decision process include those formally
endowed with decision competence, such as executives, legislators and
judges, and all those other actors who, though not endowed with formal
competence, may nonetheless play important roles in influencing decision
outcomes. In international decision, this means examining, in addition to
formal international organizations, state officials, 8 non-governmental
organizations, 9 pressure groups, interest groups, gangs, and individuals, who
act on behalf of other participants and on their own.'
By the same token, the inventory will not be of much use if it does not
take account of the perspectives of these actors. These perspectives include
their specific patterns of identification and disidentification, their matter-of-
fact expectations of past and future, and the value demands they project. It is
clear that in a complex arena, such as international politics, the perspectives of
the various participants actually playing a role in decision often diverge
greatly in critical ways.
Situations, as the New Haven School uses the term, refers generally to
where decisions are made and the distinctive properties of that "where."
Conventional legal analysis generally looks to courts, secondarily examining
the work of executive branches and legislatures. The New Haven School
adopts a more functional approach in which it focuses on the range of
centralized and decentralized settings" in which decisions are actually taken,
their varying degree of organization and formality, the extent to which they
are specialized or not specialized, and the extent to which they are continuous
or episodic. We also consider it important to examine the extent to which
participants in a particular situation perceive themselves to be in a state of
crisis in which critical values are deemed to be at stake.
The resources on which participants draw-their "bases of power"--
incorporate both effective power and symbols of authority. The New Haven
School considers it appropriate for the jurist to correlate the extent to which
control of power is available to support particular formulations that are
presented as law.
The ways in which resources (material and symbolic) are manipulated,
or the strategies used by different participants, involve the management of
resources aimed at optimizing preferred outcomes. Strategic modes are
considered along a persuasive-coercive continuum. They include diplomatic,
propagandistic, economic, and military techniques in varying ensembles.
8. While states continue as the primary organizations and value providers, private entities,
with their effectiveness enhanced by technological innovations relatively insusceptible to control by
established territorial elites (such as the Internet) exert an ever-increasing influence on the global
process of authoritative and controlling decision. Michael Reisman, Designing and Managing the
Future of the State, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409, 416 (1997).
9. Siegfried Wiessner, Legitimacy and Accountability of NGOs: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective, in W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
305, 305-311 (2004).
10. McDougal, Reisman & Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social Process,
supra note 2, at 822-26.
11. As to the choice of methodological frameworks depending on institutional determinants,
see Siegfried Wiessner, International Law in the 21s' Century: Decision-making in Institutionalized and
Non-Institutionalized Settings, 26 THESAURUS ACROASIUM 129 (1997).
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The outcomes of interaction are tracked on a continuing basis and in
terms of the five previously identified phases or features of a context.
The mapping of social and decisional contexts permits the observer or
the person trying to influence decision to orient himself or herself contextually
in the relevant processes. It is clear that there can be no single one-size-fits-all
map for every problem. Contexts vary enormously. Thus the participants who
will be relevant for a problem involving international security will include the
major powers, those who can support or work against them, including major
antagonists, international organizations or other institutions which may be
relevant for some of the decision functions. For example, for a problem
involving international investment law in a particular context, the critical
participants are likely to be the states concerned, the multinational enterprises
involved in a particular investment, civil society, and institutions specialized
in the transnational wealth process. The point of emphasis is that a functional
approach, using a mapping procedure that is designed to minimize the chances
of overlooking pertinent factors and relationships, enables the lawyer and
policy-scientist to operate with a realistic sense of the relevant processes.
Modem science has been acutely conscious of the need for sensitivity
and clarity about the perspective from which phenomena are viewed. For any
phenomenon, there are many possible standpoints, each of which affects and
shapes what is viewed and how it is viewed. An indispensable intellectual tool
concerns clarity with regard to what the New Haven School has referred to as
"observational standpoint." 12 Both the reference and content of the term "law"
or "choice" will vary depending on whether the standpoint is that of a member
of the elite or the rank-and-file, whether the observer is a member of the
system observed and has internalized its folklore, myth and miranda, or is an
outsider. Perception of the same phenomenon may vary depending on the
culture, class, gender, age, or, in particular, by the profound influence of
crisis-experience or trauma on the observer. Even within the formal
institutions of the legal establishment, reference and content will vary
depending on whether the observer is a legislator, a judge, a prosecutor, a
juryman, a defense attorney, an accused, or a victim.
The delimitation of an appropriate focus of inquiry is important because
it affects the comprehensiveness and realism (or contextuality) of inquiry, the
manageability with which problems are formulated, and the effectiveness with
which the different intellectual tasks can be performed. In this perspective, all
law is conceived not simply as traditional rules, 13 but in more comprehensive
terms, as decision, composed of both perspectives and operations; as
12. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International Law, 86 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 118, 120 (1992) [hereinafter Reisman, View from the New Haven School].
13. "The jurisprudence of positivism provides the counterimage to this empirical, dynamic
conception of law. Its common focus on 'existing' rules, emanating solely from entities deemed equally
Isovereign,' does not properly reflect the reality of how law is made, applied and changed. Positivism
remains fixated on the past, trying to reap from words laid down, irrespective of the context in which
they were written, the solution to a problem that arises today or tomorrow in very different
circumstances." Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
316, 320 (1999) [hereinafter Wiessner & Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence]. For an engagement
of other jurisprudential approaches, see id. at 320 n.7.
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authoritative decision, combining elements of authority and control; and not
as occasional choices, but as a continuous process of authoritative decision,
both maintaining the constitutive features by which it is established and
projecting a flow of public order decisions for the shaping and sharing of
community values. 14 Each of these distinctive emphases may be briefly
elaborated.
One component of the most comprehensive process, as of all the lesser
community processes, is a process of effective power in the sense that
decisions are in fact taken and enforced, by severe deprivations or high
indulgences, which are inclusive in their effects. The experience of those who
use the jurisprudence of the New Haven School shows that full and realistic
description of such effective power processes-in terms that include all
important participants, perspectives, arenas, bases of power, strategies, and
outcomes-is necessary, both for understanding and influencing.
The New Haven School also provides a way of organizing thought and
action with respect to any decision process. The School identifies seven
decision functions, each of which is engaged in every decision process. The
functions that compose decision processes include intelligence, promotion,
prescription, invocation, application, termination, and appraisal. The fact
that each function is always in operation does not mean that it is being
performed well. Accordingly, the New Haven School offers criteria for
appraising the performance of each function, and by bringing each function
into clear view, the School provides a nuanced and realistic way to improve
decision.
Starting from the premise that law should serve human beings, the New
Haven School anchors its policy-oriented search for a world public order of
human dignity 16 in the universe of human aspirations, which are expressed
empirically in its characterization of eight values, 17 i.e., power, enlightenment,
wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect, and rectitude. The jurisprudence
of the School allows for goal-setting beyond what has been achieved in the
past, and for intellectual preparation for leadership in the face of ever-new
problems in an ever-changing world.
Two papers presented at the Conference, on which we were invited to
comment, demonstrated the need for and the utility of the New Haven
School's methods. Paul Schiff Berman's A Pluralist Approach to
14. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1967), reprinted in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 73 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1969), also reprinted in
MYRES S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 191 (1981).
15. Id.; see also Reisman, View from the New Haven School, supra note 12, at 122-123.
16. Cf MYRES S. McDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY
(1980). See also Wiessner & Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, supra note 13.
17. The term "values" is used to designate the broad categories of events that gratify desire. In
empirical terms, they signify the things humans "value." Analytically, they characterize the assets
humans draw on in their efforts to achieve their goals (base values); preferentially, they relate to
"preferred events" (scope values). 1 LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 2, at 336.
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International Law 18 is a plea for recognition of the variety of legal systems
existing on this planet. He found it useful to turn to the work of Robert Cover,
lamentably cut short by his untimely passing, on the nomos, the narratives and
precepts of communities other than the state. 19 Cover provided valuable
insights into the life and decisionmaking processes of such communities, as
exemplified by religious groups such as the Amish and the Mennonites.20
Cover's work can be read as a plea for a larger range of self-government for
groups challenged to defend their "inner worlds," 1 their religion and their
culture, against unremitting attacks by the "modern" world. Today's
indigenous peoples' claims to self-determination, 22 alluded to by Cover in one
footnote,23 come to mind. But the policy and intellectual problem in both
national and international law is to determine when and how the legal
arrangements of one system should trump another. For all his interest in
validating the claims to recognizing distinct legal systems of such "insular"
communities, Cover was blunt and uninflected as to which legal system, in
case of conflicting prescriptions, should prevail. It was the nation-state, if it
was articulating its demand on the normative level of the constitution. 24 The
New Haven School, in distinguishing between the "public order" and the
"civic order," and in expressing a preference for maximizing the civic order,
but intervening in it when its practices violate goals of public order, provides a
far more refined decision tool.
25
Unlike Cover's opus, Berman's article does not answer the question of
which legal system will or should prevail in cases of conflict, and who should
make such a decision. Berman, in opening the concept of law to non-state
communities, would include not only religious communities, but also racial
and ethnic groups, corporations, universities, gangs, terrorist cells, etc. To
weed out the poisonous ones, Berman suggests delegitimizing "illiberal"
communities, but he never explains what he means by the term "illiberal." Nor
does he explain who should determine which communities and their legal
systems are to be delegitimized in this fashion.26 Ultimately, since his pluralist
theory limits itself to mere description of the various contending legal orders,
a task well performed historically by anthropologists of law and, more
broadly, social scientists, he stops far short of the thorough problem- and
policy-, i.e. solution-oriented inquiry the New Haven School suggests. His
18. Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 301
(2007).
19. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4,40 (1983).
20. Id. at 26-35.
21. W. Michael Reisman, International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others, 9 ST. THOMAS L.
REv. 25, 25 (1996).
22. For details, see Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Perspective, 12 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 57, 116-120 (1999); and
Siegfried Wiessner, Joining Control to Authority: The Hardened "Indigenous Norm," 25 YALE J. INT'L
L. 301 (2000).
23. Cover, supra note 19, at 32 n.94.
24. Id. at 66 (referring to the "counterclaim of constitutional redemption," which, in his view,
would "pose no general threat to the insular community").
25. See W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 103 YALE L.J.
401 (1993); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).
26. See Berman, supra note 18, at 32 1.
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focus on process alone expressly disavows a desire to influence decision;
refusing to provide any substantive guiding light for resolving conflicts
between competing legal orders, he leaves the content of decisionmaking to
the unbridled processes of effective power.
Christopher Borgen's plea for the diversity of legal orders bases itself on
a purportedly realistic analysis of geopolitical groupings holding "different,
deeply-held beliefs. 27 From the New Haven School's perspective, and with
respect, we found neither novelty nor useful inference in this data. There is
undeniably "normative friction" between those groupings, as he sees them.
There has always been. There is also an undeniable process of communication
and interaction between those groupings that results in identifying certain
values as common and certain behavior as lawful or unlawful. That
identification is, of course, one of the central enterprises of law. Borgen does,
indeed, speak of "unjust orders," 28 but he never explains the limits to the
development of diverse legal orders, as implied in this concept. His antipathy
toward "cosmopolitanism"' 9 is palpable and possibly at variance with an order
of law built on universal standards of respect for human dignity. Sadly, he
decides to ignore the approach of the New Haven School, because he assumes
it was an outgrowth of and intellectual weapon for the Cold War. The School
existed long before the Cold War and thrives long after it.
If we may be permitted a "cosmopolitanism," we would conclude with
the Chinese proverb which Chairman Deng Xiao Ping made famous: It does
not matter whether a cat is black or white but whether it catches mice. Our
loyalty is to the values of human dignity and our goal is a world order
producing and distributing those values. The New Haven School was
established to refine and apply tools to achieve that goal. If there is a better cat
around, we would be the first to use it. As far as we have been able to tell,
there is not.
27. Christopher J. Borgen, Whose Public, Whose Order? Imperium, Region, and Normative
Friction, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 329, 361 (2007).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 362.
